diff --git a/pb_hooks/whoami.pb.js b/pb_hooks/whoami.pb.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8499685
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pb_hooks/whoami.pb.js
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/// <reference path="../pb_data/types.d.ts" />
+
+// Token introspection for amber-api (the facts service).
+//
+// GET /api/amber/whoami   (auth: users)  → { id, nsfwEnabled }
+//
+// WHY THIS EXISTS: amber-api has to know whether an inbound request carries a
+// valid Amber user token before it will spend an ffprobe on a caller-supplied
+// URL. PocketBase auth tokens are stateless JWTs signed with a per-user secret
+// that only PocketBase holds, so **offline verification is impossible by
+// design** — a third-party service cannot check one itself. The only correct
+// check is to present the token here and see whether PocketBase accepts it,
+// which `$apis.requireAuth("users")` does before this handler ever runs.
+//
+// So the handler body is deliberately trivial: reaching it *is* the answer. It
+// returns the two facts amber-api needs and nothing else — no email, no
+// username, no profile list. A token-introspection endpoint is a tempting place
+// to leak account data, and amber-api has no business knowing any of it.
+//
+// `nsfwEnabled` is included because it's the same admin-only flag that gates
+// adult release channels, and a future amber-api surface may need to scope
+// results by it. It is read-only here.
+//
+// amber-api caches positives for ~10 minutes and negatives for ~30 seconds, so
+// this route sees roughly one request per device per 10 minutes — cheap enough
+// to sit in front of every probe lookup.
+//
+// NOTE: PocketBase runs each routerAdd handler in its own isolated JSVM, so
+// anything a handler needs must be declared INSIDE it — file-scope helpers throw
+// ReferenceError at request time. Nothing is hoisted here; keep it that way.
+routerAdd("GET", "/api/amber/whoami", (e) => {
+  return e.json(200, {
+    id: e.auth.id,
+    nsfwEnabled: e.auth.getBool("nsfwEnabled"),
+  })
+}, $apis.requireAuth("users"))
diff --git a/scripts/verify.py b/scripts/verify.py
index fee8dfa..8836c2e 100644
--- a/scripts/verify.py
+++ b/scripts/verify.py
@@ -244,5 +244,31 @@ st, r = req("POST", "/api/collections/watch_state/records", alice,
              "updatedAt": CLIENT_TS})
 check("alice CANNOT attach a row to bob's profile", st, st in (400, 403, 404))
 
+# --- /api/amber/whoami: token introspection for amber-api ---
+# amber-api cannot verify a PocketBase JWT itself (stateless, signed with a
+# per-user secret PocketBase alone holds), so it asks this route. These checks
+# guard two things: that it fails closed for anyone unauthenticated, and that it
+# leaks nothing beyond the two fields amber-api needs.
+st, r = req("GET", "/api/amber/whoami")
+check("whoami: anonymous → 401 (fails closed)", st, st == 401)
+
+st, r = req("GET", "/api/amber/whoami", "Bearer totally-not-a-token")
+check("whoami: bogus token → 401", st, st == 401)
+
+st, r = req("GET", "/api/amber/whoami", alice)
+check("whoami: valid token → 200", st, st == 200)
+check("whoami returns the caller's own id", st, r.get("id") == ua["id"])
+check("whoami returns nsfwEnabled", st, r.get("nsfwEnabled") is True)
+# A token-introspection endpoint is a tempting place to leak account data;
+# amber-api has no business knowing the email, username or profile list.
+check("whoami leaks nothing else", st,
+      set(r.keys()) == {"id", "nsfwEnabled"})
+
+# Per-caller, not "some authenticated user": a shared/cached answer here would
+# let amber-api attribute one device's requests to another account.
+st, r = req("GET", "/api/amber/whoami", bob)
+check("whoami is per-caller (bob's token returns bob's id)", st, r.get("id") == ub["id"])
+check("whoami ids are distinct per caller", st, ua["id"] != ub["id"])
+
 print("\n" + ("ALL CHECKS PASSED" if allpass else "SOME CHECKS FAILED"))
 sys.exit(0 if allpass else 1)